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Abstract 
 
  
Recent literature has shown that international financial integration facilitates 
cross-country consumption risk sharing. We extend this line of research and 
demonstrate that the decomposition of financial integration into good and 
bad plays an important role. We also propose new measures of countries’ 
capital market integration, based on good and bad volatility shocks, as well 
as country specific indices of consumption risk sharing. We document a 
decoupling of individual consumption growth from global risk sharing after 
episodes of negative cross-spillovers, and a recoupling after positive 
spillovers. Our results support current views in the literature that advocate 
for an asymmetric treatment of good and bad volatility shocks, in order to 
assess the macroeconomic dynamics that follow risk episodes. They also 
challenge previous views in the literature that present capital market 
integration (without differentiating between positive and negative shocks) as 
a prerequisite for higher international consumption risk sharing. Overall, they 
cast doubts on the actual scope for consumption risk sharing across global 
financial markets. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“I, __, take,__, you for my lawful wife/husband, to have and to hold from this day forward, for 
better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and health, until death do us part.” 
 
These are the traditional catholic wedding vows, but the general idea is the same across 
many religions (and even civil marriage contracts): the two sides of the contract commit to 
be together in good and bad times. Yet, divorce is a phenomenon as common as marriage1 
and divorce rates are indeed sensitive to economic downturns 2 . We explore whether 
something similar occurs to countries. Naturally, we need to be more specific than this. 
The hypothesis we want to test is whether good and bad volatility cross-spillovers do not 
only lead to asymmetric capital market integration dynamics, but also to asymmetric coupling-decoupling 
dynamics with respect to the global consumption risk-sharing patterns. That is, we analyze whether the 
degree of international consumption smoothing shared by a specific country with the 
global economy changes, in an asymmetric fashion, following ‘good’ or ‘bad’ cross-
spillovers in the global financial markets. We show that indeed this is the case. Countries 
decouple from the general trend of consumption risk sharing after episodes of negative 
cross-spillovers in the stock market, and they synchronize when cross-spillovers are 
positive. These results emphasize the convenience of considering differentiated effects of 
good and bad volatility shocks from the financial markets to the real economy, and cast 
serious doubts on the ability of international financial markets to smooth consumption 
across different countries. If consumption risk-sharing increases only when good capital 
market integration is observed, it means that it does not precisely when it is more 
important: when bad news hit the market. 
Enabling consumption risk sharing among agents is a fundamental function (if not the 
fundamental function) of financial markets. This is true not only within the borders of a 
given economy, but also across different national markets. For this reason, standard 
theories in international finance (Obsfeld and Rogoff, 1996) predict perfect international 
consumption risk sharing under capital markets perfectly integrated (as well as under 
homogeneous isoelastic utility functions). It does not come as a surprise that the literature 
has therefore devoted considerable efforts to test for the presence of international 
consumption risk sharing in the data. Starting with the seminal works by Cochrane (1991), 
Mace (1991) and Obstfeld (1994), the empirical literature has assessed the extend of 
international consumption risk sharing by conducting regressions of cross-sectionally 
demeaned consumption on cross-sectionally demeaned income, considering fixed effects 
by country (see for instance, Sorensen and Yosha, 2000; Sorensen et al., 2007; Kose et al, 
2009; Islamaj and Kose, 2016; Rangvid et al., 2016) or more sophisticated forms of 
                                                        
1 See the American Psychological Association web site: http://www.apa.org/topics/divorce/ 
2 Albeit in a seemly counterintuitive manner, it seems that divorces reduce during recessions and they increase 
when the transaction costs of falling apart are lower. See Amato and Beattie (2011), Cohen (2014), and 
references therein.  
heterogeneity across countries (Fuleky et al., 2015). The main conclusion of this literature is 
that the level of risk sharing is not as high as expected. 
Our starting point to analyze the relationship between capital market integration and 
international consumption risk sharing is to show that there are considerable differences in 
the degree of capital markets integration after good and bad volatility shocks.  To properly 
measure the interaction of one country with the global financial market, we restrict 
ourselves to stock markets. We construct good and bad volatility indices for 17 mature and 
relatively open financial markets corresponding to United States, Japan, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Canada, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, and Austria. Good and bad volatilities are, 
in this context, monthly-realized semivariances (RS) estimated with daily data (see 
Barndorff-Nielsen et al., 2010). Then, we use good and bad volatilities as inputs to built 
separate dynamic systems of good and bad volatility cross-spillovers. Those systems rely on 
traditional Vector Autoregressive (VAR) representations and Forecasted Error Variance 
Decompositions (FEVD), which allow us to construct total cross-spillovers and directional 
spillover statistics (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2014), but also to propose our own measures of 
capital market integration, which consider relevant asymmetries embedded in the sign of 
the volatility shocks, as well as time- and country-specific variation. We find that while the 
good cross-spillover index has increased on a constant pace since 1996, the bad cross-
spillover index exhibits clear cycles and has been more stable. 
In a second step, we investigate whether there is time variation in international 
consumption risk-sharing. We construct a global index of consumption risk sharing from 
1997 to 2017. We use quarterly data (unlike the extant literature) and a recent sample (also 
unlike the previous studies), which allows us to challenge current views stating that in the 
globalization period (1995-ownwards) consumption risk sharing presents an unstoppable 
upwards trend (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; Islamaj and Kose, 2016; Rangvid et al., 
2016). We find that international consumption risk sharing is better described by cycles 
than by trends, in which clear patterns of more risk sharing and less risk sharing arise, 
following upturns and downturns of the global economic activity. 
Finally, we analyze explicitly the relation between capital market integration and 
international consumption risk sharing. Interestingly, the observed cycles in consumption 
risk-sharing are related, more than with the overall level of capital market integration, with 
the sign of the cross-spillovers. Our strategy to achieve this conclusion consists of first, 
measuring the exposure of the country-specific (cross-sectionally demeaned) real 
consumption growth rate to the general pattern of consumption risk sharing. Second, we 
include these statistics in a panel regression that controls for other measures of capital 
market integration, trade integration, and the level of exchange rate flexibility of every 
country, to calculate their association with our measures of good and bad capital market 
integration. It turns out that there is a strong economical and statistical significant 
association between exposure to consumption risk sharing and good and bad integration, 
prominently featured by an opposite sign. While negative cross-spillovers reduce the 
synchronization of a country with the global patterns of risk sharing, positive cross-
spillovers produce the opposite effect.  
This work’s main contribution to the previous literature is the empirical assessment of the 
different impacts of good and bad capital market integration on the cross-sectional and 
time-series dynamics of international consumption risk sharing by the first time. Segal et al. 
(2015) have recently emphasized the fundamental asymmetry in the propagation of good 
and bad volatility shocks. These authors claim that good and bad macro-volatility shocks 
have different impacts on financial prices and on the real economy. Their study shows that 
actual investment, expected consumption, prices and other macro-indicators react 
asymmetrically to good and bad volatility shocks (with positive and negative responses 
respectively). They also show that the market prices those asymmetric risks in economical 
and statistical significant ways. Our work relies on crucial insights from that study, which 
allow us to enhance our comprehension of international consumption risk sharing, and also 
gives insights for future work that seek to analyze this kind of asymmetries from new 
theoretical and empirical perspectives.  
As a second contribution to the fields of international finance and international economics, 
we provide new measures of capital market integration that consider the evident 
asymmetries in the propagation of good and bad volatility shocks, and we also provide 
indices of the level of risk-sharing exhibited by a given country according to its relationship 
with the general pattern of consumption risk sharing of the global economy.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describe the steps we follow 
to test our main hypothesis. Section 3 presents the data we use. Results are in Section 4.  
Section 5 gives concluding remarks. 
 
2. Methodology 
We constructed: (i) indices of asymmetric capital market integration, and (ii) country 
specific indices of consumption risk sharing. To calculate (i), first, we estimated good and 
bad volatilities using realized semivariances (Barndorff-Nielsen et al., 2010), and then we 
placed these series in different VAR systems, from which we extracted forecast error 
variance decomposition (FEVD) series. Then, we constructed total cross-spillovers for the 
two systems and net spillovers for each country in the spirit of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 
2014). Finally, we constructed our two measures of capital market integration by summing 
up the contribution of each market to the FEVD of the volatility of the rest of the system, 
and the contribution of the rest of the system volatility to the FEVD of each market’s 
volatility. To obtain (ii), first, we estimated a quarterly measure of global consumption risk 
sharing, calculated as the slope of a regression of idiosyncratic consumption growth on 
idiosyncratic income growth (after controlling for global real consumption and income). 
Then, we used this measure as a factor that allows us to calculate the exposure of individual 
country consumption growth to the general pattern of risk sharing.  
Once (i) and (ii) were calculated, we evaluated the impacts of good and bad capital market 
integration in the cross-sectional and time-series dynamics of international consumption 
risk sharing. By doing this, we are able to provide evidence on coupling or decoupling 
processes faced by each country after good and bad cross-spillovers in the global financial 
markets. To this end, we used a panel regression that exploits cross-sectional and time-
series variation in our data set, and we control for measures of exchange rate flexibility, 
trade integration, and a traditional proxy for (symmetric) capital market integration.  
2.1. Good and bad volatility estimation 
Consider the traditional realized volatility (RV) estimator, as explained for example in 
Andersen et al. (2010). The RV estimator of log asset prices 𝑌 can be expressed as: 
𝑅𝑉 = ∑ (𝑌𝑡𝑗 − 𝑌𝑡𝑗−1)
2
𝑛
𝑗=1 ,      (1) 
where 0 = 𝑡0 < 𝑡1 < ⋯ < 𝑡𝑛 = 1 are the times at which prices are available. This has 
been proved to be an extremely useful methodology to estimate and forecast conditional 
variances for risk management and asset pricing3. Nevertheless, Barndorff-Nielsen et al. 
(2010) stress out that this measure is silent about the asymmetric behavior of jumps, which 
is important for example to estimate downside or upside risk. Thus, they propose a new RS 
estimator as follows: 
𝑅𝑆− = ∑ (𝑌𝑡𝑗 − 𝑌𝑡𝑗−1)
2
1𝑌𝑡𝑗−𝑌𝑡𝑗−1≤0
𝑡𝑗≤1
𝑗=1
𝑅𝑆+ = ∑ (𝑌𝑡𝑗 − 𝑌𝑡𝑗−1)
2
1𝑌𝑡𝑗−𝑌𝑡𝑗−1≥0
𝑡𝑗≤1
𝑗=1
 ,   (2) 
where 1𝑦 is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if the argument y is true. The former 
equation provides a direct estimate of downside risk and the latter of upside risk. 
Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2010) also provide the asymptotic properties of this estimator, 
using the arguments and the central limit theorem for bipower variations of uneven 
functions, developed by Kinnebrock and Podolskij (2008). In our estimations we used daily 
stock market data and we aggregated within months in order to compute the two 
semivariances required, which by construction have a monthly frequency. We used the 
estimators in equation 2 to construct good and bad volatility series for each of the N=17 
markets in our sample. After this procedure we ended out with 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁 series of good 
volatility 𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+   and 17 series of bad volatility 𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡
− , which are the main input of the next 
step, the VAR representation. 
2.2. VAR and FEVD representations 
Our good and bad spillover indices and our measures of capital market integration were 
built on two VAR systems with N=17 in each case, and were drawn from associated 
                                                        
3 See Liu et al. (2015) and references therein.  
forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) statistics. The errors were estimated from 
the moving average representation of the VAR as follows: 
𝑋𝑡 = Θ(𝐿)𝜀𝑡,       (4) 
𝑋𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝜀𝑡−𝑖
∞
𝑡=0 ,      (5) 
where 𝑋𝑡  is a matrix 𝑇 × 𝑁, Θ(𝐿) = (𝐼 − 𝜙(𝐿))
−1 , 𝜀𝑡  is a vector of independently and 
identically distributed disturbances with zero mean, and Σ  covariance matrix, 𝐴𝑖 =
𝜙𝐴𝑖−1 + 𝜙𝐴𝑖−2 + ⋯ + 𝜙𝐴𝑖−𝑝 is a matrix that contains the parameters of the system, p is 
the number of lags used in the estimation, and T is the last period (month) in the sample. 
Naturally 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑅𝑆𝑡
+ or 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑅𝑆𝑡
− for the good and bad volatilities system, respectively. To 
estimate the FEVD from the h-step ahead forecast, we followed the generalized VAR 
proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998). 
The errors in the FEVD can be divided into own variance shares or cross variance shares. The 
former are the fractions of the system errors that are related to a shock to 𝑥𝑖 on itself, 
while the latter are the portion of the shocks on 𝑥𝑖 related to the rest of the semivariances 
in the system. Thus, the h-step ahead FEVD can be defined as: 
𝜃𝑖𝑗(𝐻) =
𝜎𝑗𝑗
−1 ∑ (𝑒𝑖′𝐴ℎΣ𝑒𝑗)
2𝐻−1
ℎ=0
∑ (𝑒𝑖′𝐴ℎΣ𝐴ℎ′𝑒𝑖)
𝐻−1
ℎ=0
,      (6) 
where Σ is the variance matrix of 𝜀𝑡, 𝜎𝑗𝑗 is the standard deviation of the j-th equation, and 
𝑒𝑗 is a vector with ones in the i-th element and zero otherwise. To guarantee that the sum 
of each row equals 1, each entry of the variance decomposition must be normalized as 
follows: 
?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝐻) =
𝜃𝑖𝑗(𝐻)
∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗(𝐻)
𝑁
𝑗=1
,      (7) 
where ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝐻) = 𝑁
𝑁
𝑖,𝑗=1 . 
 
2.2.1. Total and net spillovers 
With the normalized variance decomposition the total spillover index proposed by Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2012, 2014) can be calculated as: 
𝐶(𝐻) =
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝐻)
𝑁
𝑖,𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝐻)
𝑁
𝑖,𝑗=1
× 100,   (8) 
This index measures the percentage variance that is explained by the cross-spillovers. It can 
be extended to a directional spillover index, in which the effect of a shock to 𝑥𝑗 on the variable 
𝑥𝑖 is given by the following quantity: 
𝐶𝑖 ← 𝑗 (𝐻) =
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝐻)
𝑁
𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝐻)
𝑁
𝑖,𝑗=1
× 100,    (9) 
conversely, a shock to 𝑥𝑖 on 𝑥𝑗 is given by: 
 𝐶𝑖 → 𝑗 (𝐻) =
∑ ?̃?𝑗𝑖(𝐻)
𝑁
𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝐻)
𝑁
𝑖,𝑗=1
× 100,    (10) 
with the two directional spillover indices, we construct a net spillover index, given by: 
𝐶𝑖(𝐻) = 𝐶𝑖 → 𝑗 (𝐻) − 𝐶𝑖 ← 𝑗 (𝐻).    (11) 
The net spillover index is a measure of the effect related to a shock in the variable 𝑥𝑖 on 
the rest of the system. Therefore, each series within the system will be either a net receiver or 
a net transmitter of shocks.  
 
2.2.2. Capital market integration (good and bad) 
Analogously, a measure of the total interaction of a given market with the rest of the 
system can be constructed by replacing the negative sign in equation 11 with a positive one, 
as follows:  
𝐼𝑖(𝐻) = 𝐶𝑖 → 𝑗 (𝐻) − 𝐶𝑖 ← 𝑗 (𝐻).        (12) 
We propose 𝐼𝑖(𝐻) in (12) (the total interaction of each market both, as receiver and 
exporter of volatility, with the system as a whole) as our measure of good and bad capital 
market integration, depending on whether good or bad volatilities series were used in the 
estimation.  
Naturally, the estimations above allow us to analyze static spillovers across stock markets, 
but they are silent about the dynamics in the system. Dynamics are introduced by 
estimating gross and net spillovers as well as capital market integration statistics using 
rolling windows in the estimation procedure. In this case an additional subscript signal time 
variation will appear in the above equations. We do not include this sign from the 
beginning to avoid an unnecessarily cumbersome notation.  
Our measures of capital market integration present two main advantages with respect to 
those used in the previous literature to analyze the impact of market integration on 
international consumption risk-sharing: (i) we distinguish between “good” and “bad” 
financial integration, which allows us to explore possible differences in the degree of capital 
markets integration after good and bad volatility shocks, and (ii) they are calculated at a 
monthly frequency, which allows us to detect not only the presence of trends but also 
cycles in the level of capital market integration.4  
 
 
                                                        
4 As a measure of market integration, Rangvid et al. (2016) use the dispersion of equity return across 
countries as well as two alternative measures: one based on return exposures to common (global) factors, and 
one based on a world CAPM that we also include in our final regressions. Kose et al. (2009a) and Islamaj and 
Kose (2016) use multiple de jure measures of financial integration that are based on the information drawn 
from the International Monetary Fund's Exchange Restrictions and Exchange Arrangements (AREAER). 
They also check the robustness of their findings using de facto measures of financial integration: total stock 
of inflows (liabilities) and outflows (assets), foreign direct investment, equity, and debt flows. 
2.3. Measures of international consumption risk sharing 
The most traditional measure of time-varying consumption risk sharing in the literature is 
given by the following equation5: 
Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝑐𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝛼 + 𝛽(Δy𝑖,𝑡 − Δy𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,    (13) 
where Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is the real consumption growth rate of country 𝑖 in period 𝑡, Δ𝑐𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  is the global 
real consumption growth rate in period 𝑡, Δy𝑖,𝑡 is the real income growth rate of country 𝑖 
in period 𝑡, Δy𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅ is the global real income growth rate in period 𝑡, and as usual 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is white 
noise. In equation (13),  𝛽 measures the relationship between idiosyncratic consumption 
growth and idiosyncratic income growth, and as so, the higher the 𝛽  the lower the 
consumption risk sharing, and vice versa. It is worth noticing that, as stressed out by 
Fuleky et al. (2015), this relationship works better when similar (developed) countries with 
relatively open capital markets are included in the sample. Otherwise, nothing guarantees 
that the 1 imposed in front of Δ𝑐𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  in equation 13 holds in all the cases. In our sample we 
only included countries with these two characteristics and thus we estimated quarterly 
cross-sectional regressions following equation (13).  
As stated before, we are interested in analyzing coupling (or decoupling) processes between the 
global trend (cycle) of consumption risk sharing and the consumption pattern of individual 
countries in our sample. To do so, we estimated the following time varying relationship for 
each country: 
Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑠 − Δ𝑐𝑠̅̅ ̅̅̅ = 𝑎𝑖,𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑠 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑠,     (14) 
for 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁 and 𝑠 = 𝑡 + 𝑤 , where 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇  , and 𝑤  is the length of the window. 
𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡 stands for consumption risk sharing and is calculated as 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡 = 100 − 100 ∗ 𝛽𝑡, so 
that higher levels imply more risk sharing. Here, 𝑏𝑖  measures the exposure of idiosyncratic 
consumption of country 𝑖 to the general pattern of consumption risk sharing. High values 
of 𝑏𝑖  signal a high synchronization between country 𝑖 ’s consumption and the general 
pattern of consumption risk sharing. If 𝑏𝑖 is positive and large, it means that consumption 
in country 𝑖  benefits from a greater level of consumption risk sharing in the global 
economy, while if 𝑏𝑖 is negative, it means that the more risk is shared in the world, the 
lower the consumption is in country 𝑖. 𝑏𝑖 , as such, is a direct measure of the benefits in 
terms of consumption that risk sharing portrays for country 𝑖 as well as of its level of 
synchronization with the global pattern of consumption risk sharing.  
Given that 𝑏𝑖,𝑠 is time varying itself, we can now proceed to analyze whether these benefits 
obtained via consumption risk-sharing change, in an asymmetric fashion, following ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ interactions with the global financial markets. To this end, we estimated a panel 
regression. 
                                                        
5 See for a recent example Rangvid et al. (2016), but this strategy in the literature dates back to the works by 
Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), and Lewis (1996). 
3. Data 
Our main source of data was Datastream International. We used MSCI indices provided by 
Thomson Reuters for the following markets: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States. The market indices were retrieved 
with a daily frequency from February 2 1970 to November 21 2017, for a total of 12,472 
observations. The real consumption and real income data to measure degree of 
consumption risk sharing were also obtained from Datastream with a quarterly frequency 
from 1996-Q1 to 2017-Q2 for a total of 86 quarters. We used the comparable series across 
countries and markets that are provided by Datastream in every case.  
The sample period was selected mainly based on data availability considerations and 
feasibility of the VAR estimations (when the number of series is large, VAR models cannot 
be estimated consistently due to the curse of dimensionality). The 17 countries in our sample 
are those for which two conditions were satisfied: times series of (homogeneous) daily 
stock indexes can be retrieved at least since 1970, and time series of (homogeneous) 
consumption and income can be consulted at least since 1996.  
Fortunately, our daily sample starts before our quarterly sample. Thus, starting in the early 
70s allow us to estimate our first VAR rolling-window with the first 25 years of data (from 
1970 to 1995), which corresponds to the first 300 months in the sample. In this way there 
is not waste of useful information and we can estimate a feasible VAR of 17 series with 300 
monthly periods. 
In order to carry out our analysis of international consumption risk sharing, it was 
necessary to design a panel that included both capital market integration measures and 
time-varying risk exposure to the consumption risk-sharing factor. We used end of the 
quarter measures of cross-volatility shocks (which are monthly as explained above) and 
rolling windows of 20 quarters in the regressions of idiosyncratic consumption on the 
international risk-sharing factor. By doing so we guaranteed a panel of N=17 X T=63. The 
first 23 observations were lost in the first rolling window estimation of the consumption 
risk sharing statistics (20 observations) and the calculation of the annual growth rates of 
real income and real consumption (3 observations). Our final panel consists therefore of 
1,069 observations6. We will observe that there are both cross-sectional and time-series 
variation in the data, both in the regressor and the regressand, so as to guarantee the power 
in our hypothesis testing procedure.   
Our sample presents the additional advantages of: i) being restricted to relatively integrated 
and homogeneous countries in terms of economic development and capital market 
openness, which is a, traditionally overlooked, assumption of international risk sharing 
empirical exercises7, and ii) it also covers precisely the so called globalization period, in 
                                                        
6 We lost the last observation for Australia and Japan. In these cases data on import and exports were not 
available for 2017-Q2.  
7 See Fuleky et al. (2015). 
which international risk sharing is a consideration of first order importance, and which 
starts around 1995. Finally, iii) it also includes several financial and economic crises (1997-
1998, 2001, 2007-2009, 2012-2014), and hence, we guarantee sufficient downturns in the 
global economic activity and really bad volatility shocks. There are of course also important 
and well-documented upturns of the economic activity and bullish episodes in the financial 
markets. 
 
4. Results 
In Section 4.1 we present the dynamic statistics that measure good and bad volatility cross-
spillovers in the stock markets. These measures provide evidence in favor of a remarkable 
asymmetric dynamics in the propagation of volatility, which depends on the underlying 
sign of the shocks. We also report net-spillover statistics by country, which accordingly, 
exhibit a differentiated behavior whether the volatility shock is good or bad. In section 4.2 
we present our measures of (good and bad) capital market integration, which rely on 
considering cross-volatility shocks as a common risk factor for the global stock markets. As 
explained before, the two measures are constructed by summing up the contribution of 
each market to the FEV of the volatility of the rest of the system, and the contribution of 
the rest of the system volatility to the FEV of each market’s volatility. They are built upon 
sub-samples with rolling windows of 300 monthly observations, and once again 
differentiating between good and bad volatility shocks. In section 4.3 we present a quarterly 
measure of consumption risk sharing in the global economy from 1996-Q1 to 2017-Q2 
(the so called globalization period) and we estimate the time-varying exposures to this 
general trend by individual economies, this time using rolling windows of 20 quarters. 
Finally, in section 4.4 we provide evidence in favor of our compounded starting 
hypothesis: good and bad volatility cross-spillovers do not only lead to asymmetric capital 
market integration dynamics, but also to asymmetric coupling-decoupling dynamics with respect to the 
global consumption risk-sharing pattern. We discuss the main implications of these findings at 
the end of the section. 
 
4.1. Good and bad international volatility spillovers 
Figure 1 contrasts good and bad volatility cross-spillovers in the global stock market, which 
correspond to the dynamic versions of equation 8. The differences between the two indices 
are obvious. While the good volatility index (on the left) has increased on a constant pace 
since 1996 (with a pronounced positive jump in the aftermaths of the global financial crisis, 
around 2009), the bad volatility index (on the right) exhibits clear cycles (counting from 
trough to trough, one from 1996 to 2004, a second one from 2004 until around 2016, and a 
new one that seems to start in 2016). In the bottom panel of the figure we plotted together 
the two indices, in order to emphasize the relative stability of the bad volatility propagation 
compared to the clear upward trend exhibited by the good volatility cross-spillovers. The 
variation in the bad volatility index occurs in the cyclical domain, while the variation in 
good volatility is more pronounced in the trend component. Consequently, if we compare 
the beginning with the end of the sample, in terms of good cross-spillovers we observe an 
increase by more than 24 percentage points (from 62% to 86%), while in the same period 
the increment in the bad spillovers has been less than one percentage point (from 88.2% to 
89.0%). If we aim to measure capital market integration, during the last two decades, we 
certainly reach different conclusions depending on which side of the volatility we want to 
emphasize.  
 
Figure 1. Good and Bad Volatility Cross-Spillovers in the Global Stock Market. The 
figure shows good and bad volatility cross-spillovers in the global stock market for the full sample, which 
runs from February 2 1970 to November 21 2017. The estimations were performed using rolling windows of 
300 observations, forecasting horizon of 1 day, and 1 lag. The bottom panel of the Figure shows together the 
Good spillover index (blue line) and the Bad spillover index (red line). 
  
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 complement the discussion above. They show the net spillovers from each 
market to the rest of the system, for good and bad volatility shocks, respectively, which 
correspond to the dynamic versions of equation 11. In figure 2, a positive value of the 
index indicates that a certain market gives to the system more shocks of what it receives 
from it, in terms of good volatility. Accordingly, in figure 3 the same information is 
presented but this time regarding bad volatility. The differences are remarkable once again. 
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For example, let us considering the case of Australia. Australia behaves as a net receiver of 
good volatility shocks during the whole sample (from 2000 to 2017), that is, it receives 
more good volatility shocks from the system of what it produces. In marked contrast, it 
behaves as an exporter of bad volatility shocks for most of the sample period, from 2000 
to 2011. The same sort of asymmetries are also found in the cases of Japan, United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and The Netherlands. The 
more symmetric exporters and receivers of good and bad volatility are United States, 
Canada, Belgium, Singapore, Denmark, Austria and Norway. But even in these latter cases 
the differences in the propagation of good and bad volatility shocks between the mature 
stock markets in the global economy are considerable.  
 
Figure 2. Net good volatility shocks from each market to the rest of the system. The 
figure shows net good volatility shocks from each market to the rest of the system for the period January 
1996 to November 2017. The estimations were performed using rolling windows of 300 observations, 
forecasting horizon of 1 day, and 1 lag. 
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There is an additional uncovered asymmetry after observing figures 2 and 3. The size of the 
net volatility shocks is different whether volatility is good or bad. By general rule, bad 
volatility propagates more than good volatility. In the case of the US, for instance, bad 
volatility shocks are twice as large as good volatility shocks (in the net). But this difference 
is not restricted to the US market. The differences in this respect are also notorious in the 
cases of Australia, Denmark, Singapore, Australia, Italy and The Netherlands (but 
interestingly in this latter case good volatility propagates more than the bad one). There are 
also considerable differences across countries, which become evident when we compare 
for example good volatility shocks in the US or the UK with those in Singapore, Norway, 
Belgium or Denmark, twice as large in the latter than in the former markets. The same 
holds for bad volatility propagation, if anything, more evidently.  
Figure 3. Net bad volatility shocks from each market to the rest of the system. The 
figure shows bad volatility shocks from each market to the rest of the system for the period January 1996 to 
November 2017. The estimations were performed using rolling windows of 300 observations, forecasting 
horizon of 1 day, and 1 lag. 
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4.2. Good and Bad Capital Market Integration 
The previously documented asymmetries in the propagation of good and bad volatility 
shocks across the global stock markets are worthwhile on their own merits. They provide 
relevant information for international investors seeking to design optimal hedging 
mechanisms, facing asymmetric volatility shocks; or willing to construct well-balanced and 
well-diversified portfolios; and also in terms of asset pricing, as in the case of option 
pricing, when the relevant moment of the underlying spot price distribution is the volatility 
itself. Nevertheless, they also serve to motivate our indices of capital market integration. 
We construct two indices: one of them stands on good volatility shocks, while the other 
does on bad volatility shocks. Both are constructed as the sum of the FEDV of volatility in 
the VAR representation, predicted by each market for the rest of the system, and the 
FEDV of volatility that the rest of the system contributes to each market. In this way we 
seek to encapsulate in every moment the total interaction of each market both, as receiver 
and exporter of volatility, with the system as a whole. Our indices do not net the total 
effect, which certainly would lead us to underestimate the integration of a given market 
with the global market in a certain period of time. Furthermore we are not particularly 
interested (at least not yet) in exploring the asymmetries between given and receiving 
shocks, but instead we want to focus in good or bad market integration episodes. 
In this way, we aim to point out the differences in terms of consumption risk sharing 
implied by different levels of capital market integration fostered by good or bad news to 
the market. In figure 4 we present the indices constructed for each market drawing from 
the good volatility spillovers. We observe both cross-variation between the markets, and 
time-variation along the sample period. In general, there is a positive trend in terms of 
good capital market integration, understood as a larger interaction between each market 
and the rest of the system with regard to good volatility transmission. This upward trend 
starts very early in countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom (from the 
beginning of the figure, around 1996) and holds until the end of the sample. For other 
countries (US, Canada, The Netherlands, Norway), however, the situation is better 
described by cycles of integration and disintegration, in terms of volatility transmission. 
Furthermore, for markets such as Singapore, Japan or Switzerland there is not clear upward 
trend, and in the former case if there is any trend, it is downwards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Index of Capital Market Integration Constructed with Good Volatility 
Shocks. The Figure shows the total interaction of each market both, as receiver and exporter of good 
volatility, with the system as a whole. The index of good capital market integration has been constructed 
using Equation (12). 
 
When we turn our attention to figure 5, where a very different (and somehow contrasting) 
landscape emerges. Consider the case of US. In figure 4, US good capital market integration can 
be said to have increased from 2004 to the end of the sample, with a pronounced jump of 
particularly positive integration in the aftermaths of the subprime crisis and until the mid of 
the European debt crisis, around 2012. However, when we focus on figure 5, the US 
displays a persistent downward trend during the same period. That is, while US positive 
interactions with the rest of the system have considerably increased from 1996 onwards, its 
negative interactions have decreased (for 14% to slightly above 10%). The cases of 
Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, and The Netherlands are equally contrasting. On 
their side, the markets of France, Italy, Canada, Spain, and Austria can be said to be more 
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symmetric in their dynamics regarding good or bad market integration. The other markets 
are in-between this two extreme scenarios, sometimes the good and bad volatility –based 
measures evolve in the same direction, other times they wander into divergent paths8. 
 
Figure 5. Index of Capital Market Integration Constructed with Bad Volatility 
Shocks. The Figure shows the total interaction of each market both, as receiver and exporter of bad 
volatility, with the system as a whole. The index of bad capital market integration has been constructed using 
Equation (12). 
 
 
 
                                                        
8 Our results contrast with those in Islamaj and Kose (2016) and Rangvid et al. (2016). Using alternative 
measures for capital market integration, these authors find that the level of capital market integration has 
generally been trending-up since the beginning of our sample period until 2011, when their sample ends. 
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4.3. International Consumption Risk Sharing  
So far we have shown that capital market integration, when it is measured as the degree of 
interaction of each market with the rest of the system (as receptor and transmitter of 
volatility), is not as homogeneous as previously thought, even among highly developed and 
globalized markets. Thus, we can assert that indeed each country has idiosyncratic 
trajectories in terms of financial integration that have been mainly overlooked by the 
previous literature. We have also shown that capital market integration depends on the 
underlying sign of the shocks (good or bad). Now we turn our attention to international 
consumption risk sharing.  
First, we construct quarterly measures of consumption risk sharing as in equation 13, using 
cross-sectional regressions for each quarter in our sample, starting in 1997-Q1 and ending 
in 2017-Q2. Thus, we obtain an estimate of consumption risk sharing for each quarter. 
Even though our cross-sectional regressions have a quarterly frequency, we compute 
annual consumption and income growth rates, by differentiating the logs of the two 
variables with four lags in between.  
Using quarterly data prevents us from starting before our analysis, for example as far as 
1875 as in Rangvid et al. (2016), but it allows us to increase the number of observations 
regarding the so called globalization period, which starts around 1995. This is theoretically 
feasible, because there is not restriction on the frequency of the data for which equation 13 
should hold. A 𝛽 equal to zero indicates a perfect sharing of the consumption risk across 
the global economy, independently on the frequency of the growth rates in the analysis.  
In figure 6 we report our main findings in this respect. There we plot consumption risk 
sharing, which corresponds to 𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡 = 100 − 100 ∗ 𝛽𝑡 . We present both smoothed and 
unsmoothed versions of our statistic. Interestingly, we do not observe in the last two 
decades an unstoppable upward trend in consumption risk sharing. In fact, the risk sharing 
dynamics is better described by cycles than by trends. Actually, it is possible to observe one 
full cycle of risk sharing in the sample period. The expansive phase of the cycle starts in a 
trough around 2000-Q1 and reach the peak (when consumption risk sharing is maximum) 
around 2007-Q3. Then starts the contraction phase that lasts till 2014-Q2, before and after 
this long cycle of 14 years, the end of a previous cycle and the beginning of a new one are 
observed in the plot. 
It seems that consumption risk sharing is by a matter of fact very volatile. This volatility 
concentrates in the cyclical component of the series spectrum, rather than in the trend 
component. It is also evident that the dynamics of consumption risk sharing depends on 
the cycles of the global economy activity. Noticeable, risk sharing reaches its maximum 
when the subprime crisis starts, so that it coincides with a peak in the global economic 
activity (or at least in the economic activity of the US). The down phase lasts until the end 
of the European debt crisis. 2007-Q2 to 2014-Q4 is a crisis period in the financial and real 
side of the global economies, and this is especially true for those countries included in our 
sample. Thus, there is time variation in the level of global consumption risk sharing, when 
we analyze the last two decades of data and reductions in the level of consumption risk 
sharing are associated with downturns of the global economic activity, and with financial 
crises. 
 
Figure 6. Cycles of Consumption Risk Sharing in the Global Economy (1996-2017). 
The Figure shows consumption risk sharing over the period 1997 to 2017. The blue (black) line shows the 
smoothed (unsmoothed) versions of our statistics. The smoothed version is based on a kernel regression. 
 
Next, in figure 7 we present our estimates of the time-varying country-specific exposure to 
the global factor of consumption risk sharing, following equation 14. As can be noticed, 
time variation is an important feature of this exposure. Any country displays only positive 
or only negative exposures to the general trends in consumption risk sharing during the 
sample period, using rolling windows of five years. We can observe that while countries 
such as Australia or Canada display a more negative exposure to the global cycle of 
consumption risk sharing (so that their own consumption growth tend to decrease when 
risk sharing increases), other countries such as as Italy, Spain and France display the 
opposite behavior most of the time. A third group of countries, in which we count the US, 
Norway and Austria are more neutral regarding this exposure. However, in all the cases the 
exposure evolves going from positive to negative (or from negative to positive) in all the 
cases along the sample period. The t statistics of these time varying exposures are presented 
in Figure A1 of the appendix. Noticeably, even using as few as 20 observations for each 
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Year
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 R
is
k
 S
h
ar
in
g
regression suffices to reject the null hypothesis of statistical insignificance in most of the 
periods of the sample, and this holds for all the countries analyzed.  
 
Figure 7. Time-Varying Exposure to global risk sharing by country. The Figure shows 
the exposure of idiosyncratic consumption of country 𝑖 to the general pattern of consumption risk sharing 
over the period 2002 to 2017. 
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4.4. Consumption Risk Sharing and the Effects of Good and Bad Capital 
Market Integration 
In this section we estimate the relationship between individual country levels of risk 
sharing, as explained above, and individual good and bad capital market integration. To this 
end, we use a panel framework that allows us to use the time-series and cross-sectional 
information available in the data. That is, we regress crs-betas (Equation 14) on good and 
bad capital market integration country-specific- indices and some additional control 
variables. Following the earlier literature, we include an alternative measure of capital 
market integration, a control for trade integration, and indicators of country exchange rate 
flexibility. 
On the one hand, World CAPM absolute residuals (or intercepts) have been used as a 
measure of capital market integration for instance in the studies of Rangvi et al. (2016) and 
Korajczyk (1996). The general idea of this procedure is that in a model in which assets are 
priced according to their exposure to the world market portfolio, more integrated capital 
markets present lower cross-country dispersion of idiosyncratic risk. To calculate the 
idiosyncratic risk of each country we estimate a world-CAPM over the full sample period 
for each of the 17 countries9. We then save the residual time-series and took the absolute 
value to use them as our measure of disintegration, on a quarterly basis.  
On the other hand, exchange rate flexibility may improve risk sharing via changes in terms 
of trade as pointed out by Cole and Obstfeld (1991). We capture this relevant insight in our 
estimates by including in our regressions the recently proposed typology by Ilzetzki et al. 
(2017) 10. These authors’ algorithm accounts for the possibility of multiple currency poles, 
and it aims to classify the level of de facto exchange rate flexibility according to the most 
relevant anchor currencies in the global economy. These authors update and refine the 
classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and provide data through 2016 (which can be 
easily extended for the developed countries in our sample up to 2017), whereas the 
formerly wide used existing series ends in 2001. The broad categories provided by these 
authors are pegs (category 1), narrow bands (category 2), broad bands/ managed floats 
(category 3), and freely floating (category 4) 11 . In our regressions we include several 
indicator variables that take the value of one when a country belongs to one of the 
aforementioned categories in a given period of time, and zero otherwise.  
Finally, we also include an indicator of trade openness, following Kose et al. (2009b), who 
argue that trade openness also matters (joint to capital market integration) for international 
risk sharing. Following Rangvi et al. (2016), who also consider trade openness in their 
regressions, we compute trade openness as the sum of exports and imports relative to 
                                                        
9 We use the average of the countries’ returns to calculate the world market index. 
10 The classification provided by Ilzetzki et al. (2017) goes until December 2016. We use the classification of 
2016 for the year 2017. Doing so seems consistent because during the sample period the exchange rate 
classification is very persistent and most of the variability is presented across countries and not in time.  
11  The data can be download from Carmen Reinhart’s web page at:  
http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/11/ 
 
GDP for the 17 countries in our sample. Trade openness depicts a unit root. For this 
reason we included the first differences of the series in our regressions instead of the series 
in levels as done as well by the previous literature.  
We first conducted a Hausman’s test to identify whether country specific fixed effects 
should be included in the panel regressions to guarantee the consistency of the estimator 
without fixed effects. Naturally, the indicator variables were excluded from the test in this 
first step, as they do not present notable variability in time. We did not reject the null of 
consistency under both the null and the alternative, so we opted for the more efficient 
estimates (see Table A2 in the appendix). Nevertheless, in order to consider the presence 
of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the errors we use Newey-West robust standard 
errors in our calculations, presented in Table 1. In this way we avoid having to specify the 
shape of the var-cov matrix in the GLS procedure (which could lead to biases if incorrectly 
addressed). We also include in Table A1 of the Appendix, the estimations using both fixed 
and random effects, as to provide a point of comparison. Our main conclusions regarding 
the effect of good and bad capital market integration on international consumption risk 
sharing remain unaltered in all the cases. 
We document statistically significant effects in the two cases (good and bad capital market 
integration), but with opposite signs. While, positive cross-spillovers with the rest of the 
world (i.e. giving or receiving good volatility from all the other markets) increases country 
exposure to the global risk-sharing factor, negative cross-spillovers leads to a decoupling 
with the rest of the world pattern in terms of risk sharing. This asymmetric relationship is 
about twice as large in the latter (-0.28) than in the former case (0.18). Given that the most 
important benefits of international consumption risk sharing are due precisely to the ability 
of capital markets to smooth consumption fluctuations in “bad times” (sharing the risk 
across countries or individuals), our results show that these alleged benefits may be very 
limited in practice. A generalized trend of risk sharing across countries is fostered by good 
interactions with the rest of the world, and it is reduced when bad integration episodes are 
observed. In other words, risk shares the least when it is more required to do so.  
With respect to our control variables, although the CAPM residuals depict the expected 
sign (i.e. more disintegration leads to less synchronization in terms of risk sharing), they are 
not statistically significant in our main specification (they are in the alternative estimates in 
the appendix). On their side, there is not a clear conclusion regarding the role of certain 
exchange rate arrangements over others, as a factor explaining the dynamics of our 
measure of international consumption risk sharing. Managed floats and free-floats induce a 
lower level of international consumption risk- sharing with respect to pegs (which is the 
base category), while narrow bands induce a higher level of synchronization in terms of 
risk-sharing. This result might seem counterintuitive on a first glance. However, it is worth 
noticing that most of the countries classified as pegs by Ilzetzki et al. (2017), in our sample 
belong to the Eurozone, and even when they belong to a currency union, one can naturally 
expect a greater level of international consumption risk sharing among them, compared to 
the rest of the world. Finally the trade openness control turned out to be non-significant, 
despite the theoretical reasons that underlie its inclusion.  
Table 1. Consumption Risk Sharing and Good and Bad Capital Markets Integration 
 Consumption risk-sharing 
Constant 1.357** 
(0.528) 
Bad capital market integration -0.275*** 
(0.073)  
Good capital market integration 0.175*** 
(0.067) 
CAPM absolute residuals -1.450 
(0.943) 
Trade openness (in diff.) -0.618 
(0.703) 
Narrow bands indicator 0.553** 
(0.252) 
Managed-floats indicator -1.152*** 
(0.257) 
Free-floating indicator -0.161 
(0.307) 
N=1,069    R=0.283  
This table shows the results of panel regressions with robust standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level, respectively. A Hausman test of a restricted version 
of the model with no indicator variables was used to discard the presence of fixed effects. The base category 
measured by the intercept are “pegs”, which includes currency unions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
How does capital market integration impact on consumption risk sharing? Our results 
demonstrate that the answer depends on the decomposition of capital market integration 
into good and bad integration. To reach this conclusion, we propose new measures of 
countries’ capital market integration, based on good and bad volatility shocks, as well as 
country specific indices of consumption risk sharing.  
Our results show that there are indeed considerable differences in the degree of capital 
markets integration after good and bad volatility shocks. While the good cross-spillover 
index has increased on a constant pace since 1996, the bad cross-spillover index exhibits 
clear cycles and has been more stable. Thus, if we aim to measure capital market 
integration, we certainly find different results depending on which side of the volatility we 
want to emphasize. Contrary to the previous literature and thanks to the use of quarterly 
data, we also find that international consumption risk sharing is better described by cycles 
than by trends, and that its dynamics depends on the cycles of the global economy activity. 
Finally, results show that variations on bad and good capital market integration have 
significant opposing impacts on consumption risk sharing. While there is a decoupling of 
individual consumption growth from global risk sharing after episodes of negative cross-
spillovers, we observe a recoupling after positive cross-spillovers. As with traditional 
couples, decoupling is more likely to occur when things are going bad, than when past and 
present prospects are good. This result highlights a key finding of our paper, the risk 
sharing benefits of international financial integration are more apparent in “good times”. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Consumption Risk Sharing and Good and Bad Capital Markets 
Integration: Alternative Specifications  
 Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Constant 0.576 
(0.399) 
_ 
Bad capital market 
integration 
-0.164*** 
(0.029)  
-0.118*** 
(0.031)  
Good capital 
market integration 
0.145*** 
(0.033) 
0.107*** 
(0.034) 
CAPM absolute 
residuals 
-2.141*** 
(0.704) 
-2.085*** 
(0.711) 
Trade openness (in 
differences) 
-0.760 
(0.813) 
-0.644 
(0.821) 
Narrow bands 
indicator 
0.998** 
(0.398) 
_ 
Managed-floats 
indicator 
-0.487* 
(0.268) 
_ 
Free-floating 
indicator 
-1.313*** 
(0.333) 
_ 
N=1,069   
This table shows the results of panel regressions by GLS and fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level, respectively. The base category measured by the intercept are 
“pegs” which includes currency unions. 
 
Table A2. Hausman test for a restricted model  
 Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Coef. 
Diff 
S.E. 
Diff 
Bad capital market 
integration 
-0.117 -0.136 0.018  0.018   
Good capital 
market integration 
0.107 
 
0.120 -0.013 0.008 
CAPM absolute 
residuals 
-2.084 
 
-2.044 
 
-0.040 <0.001  
Trade openness (in 
differences) 
-0.644 -0.619 -0.024 <0.001 
H=7.435   (p-value=0.1146) 
 
This table shows the results of the Hausman’s test fitted on a restricted version of the model that does not 
include dummy regressors (which are ruled out by the fixed effects specification). Under both the null and 
the alternative hypotheses the fixed effects estimator is consistent, while the random effects is consistent only 
under the null. In this case the H statistic indicates that the null cannot be rejected.  
 
Figure A1. Time-Varying Exposure to global risk sharing by country (%). The Figure 
shows the exposure of idiosyncratic consumption of country 𝑖 to the general pattern of consumption risk 
sharing (black line) and the 95% confidence interval (red lines).  
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